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Abstract:  
We study the issue of integrating real and financial decisions in the monopoly 
framework. To that end, we combine the decisions of the firm with the decisions of the 
shareholders. When the managing shareholder chooses production, risk allocation, and 
the total number of shares for the risky asset, we show that there is no Nash equilibrium 
with a competitive financial market. Existence is reestablished under various restrictions 
on the set for the total number of shares. Moreover, there exists a Stackelberg 
equilibrium when the managing shareholder is the leader. In addition to discussing the 
issue of existence, we compare the equilibrium outcomes for each restriction we impose. 
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1 Introduction
Uncertain and risky events are ubiquitous in society. While economic agents
cannot eliminate all of the exogenous source of risk, they can exercise a
certain control over the amount of risk they face through the market process.1
Speciﬁcally, markets and prices allocate resources to diﬀerent risky activities,
and among diﬀerent agents. For instance, when a ﬁrm undertakes a risky
project in the real sector, the size of the project as well as the share of
risk borne by each shareholder depend on market forces in both the real and
ﬁnancial sectors. In particular, the choice and allocation of risk depend on the
prices of goods in the real sector as well as the prices of ﬁnancial instruments.
These prices depend, in turn, on the preferences of agents, the alternative
assets of the shareholders, the market structure, and the exogenous source
of risk.
Yet, in the standard framework of industrial organization, markets and
prices play no role in determining which types of risk are undertaken by ﬁrms
and which groups of agents bear the risk. Rather, risk vanishes under the
postulate that ﬁrms maximize expected proﬁt, even if their shareholders are
risk-averse. The risk-neutrality of ﬁrms owned by risk-averse shareholders is
generally justiﬁed on the grounds that the shareholders’ portfolios of assets
are well-diversiﬁed, to the point of eliminating any exposure to, and concern
for risk.2 In other words, while the shareholders are risk-averse, portfolio di-
versiﬁcation induces their ﬁrms to act as risk-neutral, and, thus, to maximize
expected proﬁt.3
There are two main issues with this justiﬁcation. First, the market pro-
cess by which shareholders diversify their portfolio is not modeled. The
1The reduction of risk comes at a cost, so that, even if feasible, an economic agent
would not necessarily eliminate risk all together.
2See Tirole (1988, pp. 34-35), including footnote 61, and Salanie´ (1997, p. 53).
3Another argument in support of the risk-neutrality of ﬁrms is that shareholders are
risk-neutral. If risk-averse agents owned shares of a risky asset, they could beneﬁt from
an arbitrage opportunity as well as rid themselves of any exposure to risk by selling their
shares to risk-neutral agents. Hence, all risky assets would be owned by risk-neutral
shareholders. Risk-neutral shareholders would invest all of their wealth in the asset with
the highest expected return, and, thus, all assets would have the same rate of return,
which is inconsistent with observed behavior.
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diversiﬁcation of assets is costly and might not beneﬁt all shareholders in
the same way. Moreover, the interplay between the shareholders’ portfolio
selection and the ﬁrms’ decisions is an important link. On the one hand, the
interaction of the shareholders in the ﬁnancial market inﬂuence the behavior
of the ﬁrms in the real market, which is not necessarily one of maximizing
expected proﬁt. On the other hand, the allocation of risk through the ﬁ-
nancial market depends on the distribution of real proﬁt, which, in turn,
depends on the decisions of the ﬁrms. Second, the high variability of all
market indicators makes it diﬃcult to believe that portfolio diversiﬁcation
renders shareholders immune to risk. Indeed, the allocation of wealth among
many assets only reduces, but cannot eliminate, the unsystematic risk that
emanates from each risky asset. Moreover, systematic risk remains and af-
fects the payoﬀs of all assets. Thus, despite the availability of a wide range of
ﬁnancial instruments, shareholders must accept risk. Recent ﬁnancial events
have further called into question the belief that risk can be eliminated. For
instance, The Economist writes:4
American mutual-fund assets have declined by $2.4 trillion–a ﬁfth
of their value–since the start of 2008; in Britain, the drop is more
than a quarter, or almost £130 billion ($195 billion). [...] Nor has
the bad news been conﬁned to equities. This year the value of all
manner of risky investments, from corporate bonds to commodi-
ties to hedge funds, has been clobbered. The belief that diver-
siﬁcation into “alternative assets”could prevent investors losing
money in bear markets has proved false.
It is the purpose of this paper to address explicitly the issue of risk and
the mechanism by which risk-averse shareholders diversify their portfolio
of assets, in the theory of the ﬁrm. In particular, we study the role of
markets and prices on the type of risky activities undertaken by a ﬁrm and
the allocation of proﬁt among shareholders. From a ﬁnancial point of view,
this is equivalent to studying the inﬂuence of markets and prices on the choice
4The excerpts are from the article “Where have all your savings gone?”of December 6,
2008 on page 13 (emphasis added).
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and allocation of a risky asset issued by a ﬁrm. To that end, we embed a
mean-variance approach to the shareholders’ portfolio selection, pioneered
by Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958), into the theory of the ﬁrm. By
establishing an explicit link between the behavior of the shareholders and
the ﬁrm’s, the real and ﬁnancial sectors are integrated. In particular, the
payoﬀ of the risky asset depends on the level of output, and reﬂects the
uncertainty that emanates from the real sector.
To that end, we consider a monopoly initially owned by an entrepreneur
(the managing shareholder) who has the ability to issue shares of a risky asset
(tied to the random proﬁt of the monopoly). In our model, the deciding share-
holder of a ﬁrm, called the entrepreneur, undertakes a risky project in the
real sector and interacts with the remaining shareholder, called the investor,
in the ﬁnancial sector. The project is risky because the ﬁrm faces a random
price in the real market. The allocation of risk among risk-averse sharehold-
ers is achieved by selling shares of a risky asset in the ﬁnancial market. Shares
of the risky asset deﬁne the ownership structure of the ﬁrm and represent
claims to the proﬁt derived in the real sector. While the entrepreneur allo-
cates the proﬁt of the ﬁrm among the shareholders, the entrepreneur retains
control of the ﬁrm’s decisions. Speciﬁcally, the entrepreneur decides both the
level of output and the ownership structure of the ﬁrm.
We begin by studying the Nash equilibrium with a competitive ﬁnancial
market. We ﬁrst show that there is in general no Nash equilibrium. The
reason is that, if the ﬁnancial price is given, the ﬁrm has an incentive to
increase the total number of shares to inﬁnity, which yields no solution for
the managing shareholder. We then consider two types of restrictions. The
ﬁrst type of restriction is to equate the total number of shares to output so
that each share is a claim to the proﬁt of one unit of output. The second
type of restriction is to set exogenously the number of shares. We show that
both restrictions yield existence of a Nash equilibrium with a competitive
ﬁnancial market. Also, in both cases, ﬁnancial access, i.e, ﬂoating part of the
shares, leads to the global acceptance of more risk and, hence, to an increase
of equilibrium output. However, the limits of this increase in output, as the
fraction of stock ﬂoated tends to 1, are diﬀerent according to the assumption
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made. With a ﬁxed number of shares output equals the monopoly solution,
with or without risk depending on the risk-aversion of the investor. With
the number of shares equal to total output the latter approaches the perfect
equilibrium solution, again with or without risk.
We then consider the Stackelberg equilibrium under two scenarios. In
the ﬁrst one, the entrepreneur is the leader (sophisticated agent) whereas
the investor is the follower (naive agent). In the second one, we reverse
roles by having the investor as the leader. These scenarios lead to the basic
results stated above, but diﬀer about the particular optimal solutions. Only
the competitive equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient; both Stackelberg equilibrium
lead to smaller output levels. In the competitive market, the fraction of
shares allocated to each agent is directly proportional to their respective
coeﬃcient of risk aversion; when any of the agents assumes a leading role,
that fraction is distorted to favor the leader goals. There are also diﬀerences
on how the fraction of shares ﬂoated and the equilibrium output change with
the risk aversion coeﬃcients. The fraction of shares ﬂoated always increases
when risk aversion of the entrepreneur also increases and decreases when risk
aversion of the investor increases. In the competitive market and when the
entrepreneur is leading, that fraction varies from zero to 1 when the risk
aversion coeﬃcient of the entrepreneur goes from zero to inﬁnity (or the risk
aversion coeﬃcient of the investor goes from inﬁnity to zero). But when the
leader is the investor, the fraction of shares sold varies from zero to one half;
the investor never demands more than half the shares in order to depress the
ﬁnancial price.
The relationship between risk and ﬁrm behavior has been present in the
literature for some decades. Baron (1970), Baron (1971), Sandmo (1971),
and Leland (1972) studied the impact of risk aversion on the decisions of
a risk averse ﬁrm in a competitive and in an imperfectly competitive mar-
ket. However, these early works made no attempt to relate behavior of the
ﬁrm with its ownership structure or the functioning of the ﬁnancial mar-
ket. Later works have established a relationship between real and ﬁnancial
sectors: Dotan and Ravid (1985), Prezas (1988), Brander and Lewis (1986)
and Showalter (1995), arrived there while studying the problem of optimal
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debt-equity allocation; Jain and Mirman (2000) work on insider trading also
shows that both sectors are related. Mirman and Santugini (2013) (hereafter
referred as MS) on risk-sharing and ﬁnancial markets goes much further.
They analyze a model with a risk-averse owner of a monopolist ﬁrm (the
entrepreneur) facing the option of selling part of the stock of his ﬁrm to a
risk-averse outside investor. The entrepreneur retains control over all de-
cisions of the ﬁrm, notably on the quantity of output supplied in the real
market. To optimize his utility this entrepreneur must take into account, si-
multaneously, his decisions on the real and on the ﬁnancial market, because
his ﬁnal expected wealth depends on both. This dual perspective distin-
guishes this model from most of the previous literature and integrates real
and ﬁnancial equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section 2
studies the Nash equilibrium with a competitive ﬁnancial market, whereas
Section 3 considers the Stackelberg equilibrium. We provide concluding re-
marks in Section 4.
2 Nash Equilibrium with Competitive Finan-
cial Market
In this section, we present a general model combining the behavior of the ﬁrm
(in the real and ﬁnancial sectors) and the behavior of the shareholders. We
then establish conditions under which there exists a Nash equilibrium with
a competitive ﬁnancial market. In the next section, we provide conditions
under which there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium with a non-competitive
ﬁnancial market.
2.1 Set Up
Consider a ﬁrm that is a monopoly in a real market and has access to the
ﬁnancial market.5 In the real market, the ﬁrm faces a random demand with
5The adjective real refers to the sector of goods and services other than those of ﬁnancial
nature.
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known distribution and chooses the level of output q ≥ 0. Speciﬁcally, the
random price corresponding to supplying q units is p˜R = PR(q) + ε˜ where
PR(q) is the expected inverse demand and ε˜ is a normally-distributed shock.
6
Assumption 2.1. ε˜ ∼ N(0, σ2).
The random proﬁt of the ﬁrm is thus π(q, ε˜) = (PR(q) + ε˜)q. The expected
proﬁt is assumed to be strictly concave in the level of output.
Assumption 2.2. P ′′R(q)q + 2P
′
R(q) < 0.
In the ﬁnancial sector, the ﬁrm issues S ∈ ΩS ⊆ + equity shares.7
Each share is a claim of 1
S
of the total proﬁt so that each share receives a
random payoﬀ π(q, ε˜)/S. In addition to choosing the total number of shares,
the ﬁrm decides on the fraction 1 − ω ∈ [0, 1] of the shares to be sold in
the ﬁnancial market at unit price pF .
8 Hence, the variable ω deﬁnes the
ownership structure of the ﬁrm, which speciﬁes the allocation of the random
proﬁt among the shareholders.
The objective of each shareholder is to maximize the expected utility
of ﬁnal wealth. Each shareholder diversiﬁes wealth between the risky asset
issued by the ﬁrm and a risk-free asset. Without loss of generality, we assume
that there are only two shareholders, i.e., an entrepreneur and an investor.
The entrepreneur is the founder of the ﬁrm and the original claimant of the
proﬁt generated by his entrepreneurial prospects. The entrepreneur is also
the managing shareholder of the ﬁrm, making the output decision, issuing the
total number of shares, and deciding on the number of shares to be ﬂoated.
Having no initial wealth, the entrepreneur’s random ﬁnal wealth is
W˜ ′E = ω · π(q, ε˜) + pF · (1− ω) · S (1)
where ω ·π(q, ε˜) is the entrepreneur’s portion of the random proﬁt of the ﬁrm
and pF · (1− ω) · S is the wealth generated from selling (1− ω) · S shares at
6The subscript R refers to the real sector and the tilde sign diﬀerentiates a random
variable from its realization.
7The type of restriction imposed on the set ΩS turns out to be key for the existence of
the equilibrium and the comparative analysis.
8The subscript F refers to the financial sector.
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unit price pF , and investing pF · (1− ω) · S in a risk-free asset with a rate of
return normalized to one.
Unlike the entrepreneur, the investor does not have entrepreneurial prospects
and has no direct control over the decisions of the ﬁrm. The investor uses his
initial wealth WI > 0 to purchase shares of the risky asset and the risk-free
asset. Hence, the investor’s random ﬁnal wealth is
W˜ ′I = WI + π(q, ε˜)z/S − pFz (2)
where z is the number of shares purchased by the investor. Here, WI −
pF z is invested in the risk-free asset and π(q, ε˜)z/S is the random payoﬀ
corresponding to z shares of the risky asset. Note that the return on a share
of the ﬁrm is π(q, ε˜)/S − pF .
Each shareholder maximizes the expected utility of ﬁnal wealth deﬁned
by (1) or (2). The shareholders are assumed to be risk-averse in ﬁnal wealth
with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).
Assumption 2.3. The coeﬃcients of absolute risk aversion are aE > 0 and
aI > 0 for the entrepreneur and the investor, respectively.
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From (1), given that p˜R = PR(q) + ε˜, the certainty equivalent of the en-
trepreneur is10
CEE = ω · PR(q)q + pF · (1− ω) · S − aEσ2ω2q2/2. (3)
Here, ω · PR(q)q + pF · (1− ω) · S is the expected payoﬀ to the entrepreneur
from the real and ﬁnancial sectors weighted by the level of ownership. The
term aEσ
2ω2q2/2 is the risk premium of the entrepreneur. The risk premium
plays the role of a cost, due to risk aversion, imposed on the entrepreneur for
bearing part of the risk. From (2), the certainty equivalent of the investor is
CEI = WI + (PR(q)q/S − pF )z − aIσ2(q/S)2z2/2 (4)
9In other words, utility functions for ﬁnal wealth x are exponential: u(x; a) =
−e−ax, a ∈ {aE, aI}.
10The expected utility of the entrepreneur is Eu(W˜E ; aE) = −e−aECEE , where E is the
expectation operator.
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where WI + (PR(q)q/S − pF )z is the expected mean of ﬁnal wealth and
aIσ
2(q/S)2z2/2 is the risk premium.
2.2 Equilibrium
Having described the model, we now deﬁne the Nash equilibrium with a com-
petitive ﬁnancial market. The entrepreneur and the investor move simulta-
neously in a Nash equilibrium. The ﬁnancial sector is perfectly competitive,
i.e., the ﬁnancial price is given, and, thus, neither the entrepreneur nor the
investor can take into account the eﬀect of their decisions on the ﬁnancial
price. In equilibrium, the price of the risky asset clears the ﬁnancial mar-
ket by equating the quantity demanded by the investor with the quantity
supplied by the ﬁrm (or the entrepreneur). The equilibrium consists of the
ﬁrms’ decisions made by the entrepreneur {q∗, ω∗, S∗}, the investor’s amount
of shares of the risky asset z∗, and the ﬁnancial price p∗F . The entrepreneur’s
decisions {q∗, S∗} have a direct eﬀect on the investor’s payoﬀs. However,
the investor’s decision has no inﬂuence on the entrepreneur’s payoﬀs. Both
shareholders are aﬀected indirectly by each other through the ﬁnancial price.
Definition 2.4. The tuple {q∗, ω∗, S∗, z∗, p∗F} is a Nash equilibrium with a
competitive ﬁnancial market if
1. Given {q∗, S∗} and p∗F , the investor’s quantity demanded for the risky
asset is
z∗ = arg max
z≥0
{
WI + (PR(q
∗)q∗/S∗ − p∗F )z − aIσ2(q∗/S∗)2z2/2
}
. (5)
2. Given p∗F , subject to q ≥ 0, ω ∈ [0, 1], S ∈ ΩS,
{q∗, ω∗, S∗} = arg max
q,ω,S
{
ω · PR(q)q + p∗F · (1− ω) · S − aEσ2ω2q2/2
}
.
(6)
3. Given {ω∗, S∗, z∗}, p∗F > 0 satisﬁes the market-clearing condition z∗ =
(1− ω∗)S∗.
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Proposition 2.5 states that in the absence of a restriction on the set for
the total number of shares, there is no equilibrium. Allowing the ﬁrm to
optimize on the number of shares gives the entrepreneur the incentive to
increase S to inﬁnity. The non-existence result is due to the fact the the
ﬁnancial market is competitive, i.e., the ﬁnancial price is taken as given.
Proposition 2.5. Suppose that ΩS = +. Then, there exists no Nash equi-
librium with a competitive ﬁnancial market.
Proof. From (6), given p∗F > 0, there is no solution for S
∗.
In order to obtain existence of an equilibrium, the set ΩS must be re-
stricted. We consider two types of restrictions. Both types of restrictions
essentially reduce the number of decisions for the entrepreneur from three to
two. We ﬁrst provide the equilibrium values under each restriction. We then
compare the two approaches.
The ﬁrst is to equate the total number of shares to output so that each
share is a claim to the proﬁt of one unit of output. This assumption retains
the idea that the ﬁrm wishes to increase the number of shares to increase
the proceeds from the ﬁnancial market. At the same time, it allows for the
existence of an equilibrium. Indeed, the total number of shares cannot go
to inﬁnity because, being equal to output, it is limited by the real demand
function. Proposition 2.6 characterizes the equilibrium as studied in Mir-
man and Santugini (2013). Note that existence is only possible when the
entrepreneur faces an unsharable cost of entrepreneurship. Otherwise, there
is no risk sharing.11
Proposition 2.6. Suppose that ΩS = {S|S = q ∈ +}. Then, there exists a
Nash equilibrium with a competitive ﬁnancial market as long as there is an
unsharable cost of entrepreneurship. In equilibrium, q∗ satisﬁes
ω∗ · (P ′R(q∗)q∗ + PR(q∗)) + (1− ω∗) · PR(q∗) = ω∗aEσ2q∗, (7)
11The presence of the unsharable cost of entrepreneurship is necessary for the Hessian
matrix to be negative deﬁnite.
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the allocation of risk is deﬁned by
ω∗ =
aI
aI + aE
, (8)
and S∗ = q∗. Moreover, the investor’s quantity demanded is
z∗ =
PR(q
∗)− p∗F
aIσ2
(9)
and the ﬁnancial price is
p∗F = PR(q
∗)− (1− ω∗)aIσ2q∗. (10)
Proof. See Mirman and Santugini (2013).
The second type of restriction is to set exogenously the number of shares.
Proposition 2.7 characterizes the equilibrium when the total number of shares
is ﬁxed. Hence, the ﬁrm chooses only output and ownership, i.e., {q, ω}.12
Proposition 2.7. Suppose that ΩS = {S|S = S ∈ +}. Then, there exists a
Nash equilibrium with a competitive ﬁnancial market. In equilibrium, output
q∗ satisﬁes
P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗) = ω∗aEσ2q∗, (11)
the allocation of risk is deﬁned by
ω∗ =
aI
aI + aE
, (12)
and S∗ = S. Moreover, the investor’s quantity demanded is
z∗ =
PR(q
∗)q∗/S − p∗F
aIσ2(q∗/S)2
(13)
and the ﬁnancial price is
p∗F = PR(q
∗)q∗/S − (1− ω∗)aIσ2q∗2/S. (14)
12Alternatively, setting an exogenous upper bound on the number of shares also yields
existence, i.e., ΩS = [0, S], S ∈ (0,∞).
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Proof. Given ΩS, S
∗ = S. The ﬁrst-order condition corresponding to (5)
evaluated at S∗ = S yields (13). Next, plugging (13) and S∗ = S into
the market-clearing equilibrium z∗ = (1 − ω∗)S∗ yields (14). Finally, the
ﬁrst-order conditions corresponding to (6) evaluated at S = S are
q : ω · [P ′R(q)q + PR(q)]− ω2aEσ2q = 0, (15)
ω : PR(q)q − p∗FS − aEσ2ωq2 = 0, (16)
evaluated at q = q∗ and ω = ω∗. Rearranging (15) yields (11). Plugging (14)
into (16) and solving for ω∗ yields (12).
2.3 Discussion
Having characterized the equilibrium under two types of restrictions for ΩS,
we now use Propositions 2.6 and 2.7 to compare the equilibrium values.
We begin by noting that the restriction for ΩS has an eﬀect on the level
of output, but not on the allocation of risk. Indeed, from (8) and (12), the
fraction of shares to be ﬂoated is independent of the choice of ΩS and depends
only on the relative size of the risk aversion coeﬃcients. If aE/aI → 0,
then ω∗ → 1 and the entrepreneur bears all the risk, i.e., no ﬂoating. If
aE/aI → ∞, then ω∗ → 0 and the investor bears all the risk, i.e., 100%
ﬂoating. Unlike the allocation of risk, the level of output does depend on
the choice of ΩS . Speciﬁcally, under ΩS = {S|S = q ∈ +}, from (7), access
to a ﬁnancial market induces hybrid behavior for a monopolist, that is, a
convex combination of monopoly and perfect competition in the real sector.
Under ΩS = {S|S = S ∈ +}, from (11), setting an exogenous number of
shares removes this hybrid behavior. It follows that the output level is always
smaller under ΩS = {S|S = S ∈ +} than under ΩS = {S|S = q ∈ +}.
Moreover, the equilibrium output under (11) is Pareto optimal. Indeed,
substituting (12) into (11) and rearranging the left-hand side yields
P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗) = aEσ2ω2q∗ + aIσ2 · (1− ω)2q∗. (17)
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Result (17) indicates that the total marginal revenue of output (the left-hand
side of (17)) is equal to the total marginal cost of risk for both agents (the
right-hand side (17)).13
Next, from (7) and (11), the restriction on ΩS has no eﬀect on most of
the comparative analysis for output. Indeed, the direction of the eﬀect of an
increase in aI or σ
2 is independent of the choice of ΩS . Speciﬁcally, a more
risk-averse investor induces the ﬁrm to decrease production, i.e., ∂q∗/∂aI < 0.
Similarly, regardless of the choice of ΩS, an increase in the variance of the
shock increases the marginal cost of bearing some risk, i.e., it increases the
right-hand side of both (7) and (11). This induces the ﬁrm to decrease
output, i.e., ∂q∗/∂σ2 < 0.
However, the eﬀect of the entrepreneur’s risk aversion on the level of
output depends on the restriction imposed on the total number of shares.
Indeed, under ΩS = {S|S = q ∈ +}, from (7) and (8), the sign of ∂q∗/∂aE
is ambiguous.14 However, under ΩS = {S|S = S ∈ +}, from (11) and (12),
∂q∗/∂aE < 0. When the number of shares is tied to the level of output, an
increase in aE has an eﬀect on both sides of (7). Speciﬁcally, an increase
in aE induces the entrepreneur to sell a larger fraction of the ﬁrm, i.e., ω
∗
decreases. This, in turn, has an eﬀect not only on the cost of risk (the right-
hand side of (7)), but also on the ﬁrm’s ability to exercise market power (the
left-hand side of (7)).
To understand this diﬀerence in the comparative analysis, consider now
the variance of proﬁt (which is linked to the risk premium paid to the in-
vestor). Letting V be the variance operator, VπR(q
∗, ε˜) = σ2q∗2 reﬂects the
degree to which the entrepreneur takes risk on behalf of the ﬁrm, which is
diﬀerent from the risk borne by the entrepreneur. Note that the eﬀect of
risk aversion on risk-taking depends on the restriction imposed on the set ΩS
through the level of output. As discussed, under ΩS = {S|S = q ∈ +}, it
is possible for ∂q∗/∂aE > 0, which implies that ∂VπR(q∗, ε˜)/∂aE > 0 if and
only if −P ′R(q∗) > aIσ2.
Although risk-averse shareholders have an aversion for risk, their rewards
13See Appendix A.
14Speciﬁcally, ∂q∗/∂aE > 0 if and only if −P ′R(q∗) > aIσ2.
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(expected return) depend positively on the amount of risk the ﬁrm takes.
In other words, the higher the risk premium of an investor, the higher the
premium (in terms of expected returns) given to a shareholder to bear part
of the risk of the ﬁrm. This conﬂict between shareholders disdain for risk
and the increase in the payment when risk increases is important. Under
ΩS = {S|S = q ∈ +}, the entrepreneur increases output in order to increase
the expected payment for risk sharing and thus to induce the investor to take
on more risk. This is only possible if the entrepreneur makes the ﬁrm riskier,
i.e., oﬀers a higher risk premium. A more risk-averse entrepreneur makes
the ﬁrm’s variance greater in order to increase risk sharing by increasing
the risk premium corresponding to each share sold to the investors. For
ΩS = {S|S = S ∈ +}, the entrepreneur decreases output so that the ﬁrm
takes on less risk, i.e., ∂q∗/∂aE < 0 implies that ∂VπR(q∗, ε˜)/∂aE < 0. That
is, with a ﬁxed total number of shares, the entrepreneur only reacts to an
increase in his risk aversion but has no concern for encouraging the investor
to take on more risk.
We conclude this discussion by comparing the limiting cases. We begin
with the restriction ΩS = {S|S = S ∈ +}. As σ2 → 0, the level of
output equals the solution for a risk-averse monopoly facing no risk, i.e.,
P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗) = 0. As aI = 0, ω∗ = 0 and the level of output tends to
the solution for a monopoly facing no risk, i.e., P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗) = 0. As
aI → ∞, ω∗ → 1 and the level of output tends to the solution of a monopoly
owned solely by a risk-averse entrepreneur, i.e., P ′R(q
∗)q∗+PR(q∗) = aEσ2q∗.
This is shown in Figure 1.15
As aE = 0, ω
∗ = 1 and the level of output equals the solution for a risk-
averse monopoly facing no risk, i.e., P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗) = 0. As aE → ∞,
ω∗ → 0 the level of output tends to the solution of a risk-averse monopoly
owned by the investor who takes on all the risk, i.e., PR(q
∗) = aIσ2q∗. See
Figure 2.
The limiting cases for ΩS = {S|S = q ∈ +} are as follows. As σ2 → 0,
the level of output is a linear combination of the solution for a risk-averse
monopoly facing no risk and for a competitive ﬁrm also facing no risk, i.e.,
15In the following graphs we assumed, for simplicity, that real demand is linear.
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Figure 1: The Eﬀect of aI on q
∗ and ω∗ when ΩS = {S|S = S ∈ +}.
Figure 2: The Eﬀect of aE on q
∗ and ω∗ when ΩS = {S|S = S ∈ +}
ω∗ · (P ′R(q∗)q∗ + PR(q∗)) + (1 − ω∗) · PR(q∗) = 0. As aI = 0, ω∗ = 0 and
the level of output equals the solution for a risk-averse perfectly competitive
ﬁrm facing no risk, i.e., PR(q
∗) = 0. As aI → ∞, ω∗ → 1 and the level of
output tends to the solution of a risk-averse monopoly facing risk who does
not share risk, i.e., P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗) = aEσ2q∗. See Figure 3.
Finally, as aE = 0, ω
∗ = 1 and the level of output equals the solution for a
risk-averse monopoly facing no risk, i.e., P ′R(q
∗)q∗+PR(q∗) = 0. As aE → ∞,
ω∗ → 0 the level of output tends to the solution of a risk-averse competitive
ﬁrm owned by the investor who takes on all the risk, i.e., PR(q
∗) = aIσ2q∗.16.
See Figure 4.
16This is the case in which output may go up or down, depending on which of the
extreme solutions is larger
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Figure 3: The Eﬀect of aI on q
∗ and ω∗ when ΩS = {S|S = q ∈ +}
Figure 4: The Eﬀect of aE on q
∗ and ω∗ when ΩS = {S|S = q ∈ +}
3 Stackelberg Equilibrium with Non-Competitive
Financial Market
In this section, we consider the Stackelberg equilibrium in which one agent
is sophisticated whereas the other agent is naive. In other words, one of
the agents is a leader and the other one is a follower. The Stackelberg en-
vironment is not compatible with a competitive ﬁnancial market. Hence,
the leader (whether the entrepreneur or the investor) has market power in
the ﬁnancial sector. We begin by showing that there exists a Stackelberg
equilibrium with a leading entrepreneur without the need to impose any re-
strictions on the ΩS . However, the total number of shares and the ﬁnancial
17
price remain undetermined. i.e., one depends on the arbitrary choice of the
other. We then show that there is no Stackelberg equilibrium with a leading
investor unless restrictions are imposed on the ΩS.
3.1 Leading Entrepreneur
We ﬁrst deﬁne the Stackelberg equilibrium with the entrepreneur as the
leader. We then provide equilibrium values.
Definition 3.1. The tuple {q∗, ω∗, S∗, z∗(q∗, ω∗, S∗), p∗F} is a Stackelberg equi-
librium (leading entrepreneur) with a non-competitive ﬁnancial market if
1. Given {q∗, ω∗, S∗} and p∗F , the investor’s quantity demanded for the
risky asset is
z∗(q∗, ω∗, S∗) = arg max
z≥0
{
WI + (PR(q
∗)q∗/S∗ − p∗F )z − aIσ2(q∗/S∗)2z2/2
}
.
(18)
2. Given z∗(q, ω, S), subject to q ≥ 0, ω ∈ [0, 1], S ∈ ΩS,
{q∗, ω∗, S∗} = arg max
q,ω,S
{
ωPR(q)q +D
∗(q, ω, S) · (1− ω) · S − aEσ2ω2q2/2
}
(19)
where pF = D
∗(q, ω, S) is the inverse ﬁnancial demand deﬁned by
z∗(q, ω, S) = (1− ω)S.
3. Given {q∗, ω∗, S∗, z∗(q∗, ω∗, S∗)}, p∗F > 0 satisﬁes the market-clearing
condition z∗(q∗, ω∗, S∗) = (1− ω∗)S∗.
Proposition 3.2 states that there exists an equilibrium when the en-
trepreneur is the leader. Hence, another way to reestablish existence with-
out any restriction on the total number of shares is to assume that the en-
trepreneur has market power in the ﬁnancial sector. However, the total num-
ber of shares and the ﬁnancial price cannot be uniquely and independently
determined. The reason is that the inverse ﬁnancial demand is inversely pro-
portional to S so that, from (19), the total number of shares has no eﬀect on
the entrepreneur’s certainty equivalent.
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Proposition 3.2. Suppose that ΩS = +. Then, there exists a Stackel-
berg equilibrium with a sophisticated entrepreneur. In equilibrium, output q∗
satisﬁes
P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗) = ω∗aEσ2q∗, (20)
the allocation of risk is deﬁned by
ω∗ =
2aI
2aI + aE
. (21)
Moreover, the investor’s quantity demanded is
z∗(q∗, ω∗, S∗) =
PR(q
∗)q∗/S∗ − p∗F
aIσ2(q∗/S∗)2
. (22)
and
S∗p∗F = PR(q
∗)q∗ − (1− ω∗)aIσ2q∗2 (23)
where the total number of shares and the ﬁnancial price cannot be determined
separately.
Proof. The ﬁrst-order condition corresponding to (18) yields (22). Next,
plugging (22) (for any q, ω, and S) into z∗(q, ω, S) = (1 − ω)S and solving
for the inverse ﬁnancial demand function yields
D∗(q, ω, S) = PR(q)q/S − (1− ω)aIσ2q2/S. (24)
Plugging (24) into (19) yields the entrepreneur’s maximization problem
max
q,ω
{
PR(q)q − (1− ω)2aIσ2q2 − aEσ2ω2q2/2
}
(25)
where S has no eﬀect on the entrepreneur’s certainty equivalent. From (23),
it follows that
p∗F =
(
PR(q
∗)(q∗)− aIσ2ωq∗2
)
/S∗ (26)
S∗ and thus p∗F are undeﬁned. The ﬁrst-order condition corresponding to (25)
19
are
q : P ′R(q)q + PR(q)− 2(1− ω)2aIσ2q − aEσ2ω2q = 0, (27)
ω : 2(1− ω)aIσ2q2 − aEσ2ωq2 = 0, (28)
evaluated at q = q∗ and ω = ω∗. Solving (28) for ω∗ yields (21). Plugging (21)
into (27) and rearranging yields (20). Plugging q∗ and ω∗ into (24) and
multiplying by S∗ yields (23).
Having characterized the Stackelberg equilibrium, we now compare equi-
librium values under Nash and Stackelberg. First, comparing (8) or (12)
with (21), it follows that the entrepreneur shares less risk under Stackelberg
than under Nash (regardless of the restriction on ΩS for Nash). This is due
to the fact that the investor’s coeﬃcient of risk aversion is weighed twice
under Stackelberg. Under Stackelberg, the entrepreneur takes into account
the eﬀect of an increase in shares oﬀered in the ﬁnancial price through the
marginal risk cost of the investor. Hence, the entrepreneur sets a smaller
ﬂoat of shares in order to increase the ﬁnancial price. The ﬁrm’s output is
thus lower under Stackelberg than under Nash because the right-hand side
in (20) is now bigger than in (7) or (11)17. The signs of the eﬀects of the risk
coeﬃcients on ω∗ and q∗, as well as the limits of ω∗ (when the risk coeﬃcients
approach zero or inﬁnity) remain unchanged. The limits of q∗ when aE or aI
tend to zero or when aI tends to inﬁnity are also left unchanged. However,
under Stackelberg, when aE tends to inﬁnity, ω
∗ → 0 and output q∗ satisﬁes
P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗) = 2aIσ2q∗ in the limit.
3.2 Leading Investor
Having considered the case of a leading entrepreneur, we now study the
Stackelberg equilibrium with a leading investor.
Definition 3.3. The tuple {q∗(z∗), ω∗(z∗), S∗(z∗), z∗, p∗F} is a Stackelberg
equilibrium (leading investor) with a non-competitive ﬁnancial market if
17From expression (20), it can be shown that the equilibrium output is no longer Pareto
optimal.
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1. Given {q∗(z), ω∗(z), S∗(z)}, the investor’s quantity demanded for the
risky asset is
z∗ = arg max
z≥0
{
WI + (PR(q
∗(z))q∗(z)/S∗(z)−D∗(z))z − aIσ2(z/S∗(z))2/2
}
(29)
where pF = D
∗(z) is the inverse ﬁnancial demand deﬁned by z = (1 −
ω(z))S(z).
2. Given p∗F , subject to q ≥ 0, ω ∈ [0, 1], S ∈ ΩS,
{q∗(z), ω∗(z), S∗(z)} = arg max
q,ω,S
{
ωPR(q)q + p
∗
F · (1− ω) · S − aEσ2ω2q2/2
}
(30)
3. Given {q∗(z∗), ω∗(z∗), S∗(z∗), z∗}, p∗F > 0 satisﬁes the market-clearing
condition z∗ = (1− ω∗(z∗))S∗(z).
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that ΩS = +. Then, there exists no Stackelberg
equilibrium with a leading investor.
Proof. From (30), given p∗F > 0, there is no solution for S
∗.
In order to obtain an equilibrium for 3.3 with a leading investor, we must
guaranty there is a solution for the entrepreneur’s optimization problem. As
we have seen before, this requires some kind of constraint on S. For instance,
Proposition 3.5 provides the equilibrium values under Stackelberg when the
total number of shares is set exogenously. In equilibrium, the decisions of
the entrepreneur do not depend on z directly. Hence, notation is simpliﬁed
by writing {q∗, ω∗, S∗}.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that ΩS = {S|S = S ∈ +}. Then, there exists
a Stackelberg equilibrium with a leading investor. In equilibrium, output q∗
satisﬁes
P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗) = ω∗aEσ2q∗, (31)
the allocation of risk is deﬁned by
ω∗ =
aI + aE
aI + 2aE
, (32)
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and S∗ = S. Moreover, the investor’s quantity demanded is
z∗ =
aES
2aE + aI
, (33)
and the ﬁnancial price is
p∗F = PR(q
∗)q∗/S − aE + aI
2aE + aI
aEσ
2q∗2/S. (34)
Proof. Given ΩS , S
∗(z) = S. The ﬁrst-order conditions corresponding to (30)
are
q : ω · [P ′R(q)q + PR(q)]− aEσ2ω2q = 0, (35)
ω : PR(q)q − p∗FS − aEσ2ωq2 = 0, (36)
evaluated at q = q∗(z) and ω = ω∗(z). Solving (36) yields
ω∗ =
PR(q
∗(z))q∗(z)− p∗FS
aEσ2q∗(z)2
, (37)
which does not depend on z directly. Next, plugging S∗(z) = S and (37)
into the market-clearing condition z = (1 − ω∗(z))S∗(z) and solving for the
inverse ﬁnancial demand yields
D∗(z) = PR(q∗(z))q∗(z)/S −
(
1− z
S
)
aEσ
2q∗(z)2/S. (38)
Plugging (38) into the investor’s maximization problem yields
max
z
{
WI +
(
1− z
S
)
aEσ
2q∗(z)2z/S − aIσ2q∗(z)2z2/(2S2)
}
(39)
where, from (35), q∗(z) does not depend on z. The ﬁrst-order condition is
(
1− 2z
S
)
aEσ
2q∗(z)2/S − aIσ2q∗(z)2z/S2 = 0 (40)
evaluated at z = z∗ yielding (33). Next, plugging (33) into (38) yields (34).
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Plugging (34) into (37) yields (32).
As in Nash and Stackelberg with a leading entrepreneur, the allocation of
risk under Stackelberg with a leading investor depends on the risk-aversion
coeﬃcients. However, in Stackelberg with a leading investor, it is the investor
who has to take into account the eﬀect of an increase in shares demanded in
the ﬁnancial price through the marginal risk cost of the entrepreneur. Hence,
the fraction of shares sold under Stackelberg with a leading investor is less
than under Nash, regardless of the restriction imposed on ΩS .
Under Stackelberg, the fraction of shares sold can be smaller or bigger, de-
pending on the relative size of aI and aE . Since (32) is always larger than (8)
or (12), the right-hand side of (31) is also larger and so the equilibrium
output under Stackelberg with a leading investor is smaller18.
The signs of the eﬀects of the risk coeﬃcients on ω and q remain un-
changed. The value of ω∗ = aI+aE
aI+2aE
is 1 when aE tends to zero; but when aI
tends to zero ω equals 1/2. This is quite interesting, because now, even when
the investor is risk neutral, he does not buy all the shares. Indeed, acting as
a leader, he prefers to buy less than half the shares to force the entrepreneur
into selling with a greater discount. When aI approaches inﬁnity, ω tends
to 1. However, when aE approaches inﬁnity, ω tends 1/2, essentially for the
same reason.
A corresponding behavior can be inferred about q∗. When aE tends to
zero or when aI approaches inﬁnity, ω
∗ goes to 1 and q∗ solves P ′R(q
∗)q∗ +
PR(q
∗) = aEσ2q∗. When aI tends to zero, ω∗ goes to 1/2 and q∗ solves
P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗) = aEσ2q∗/2. However, when aE approaches inﬁnity,
the problem becomes more complicated: ω goes to 1/2, but as q∗ solves
P ′R(q
∗)q∗ + PR(q∗) = aEσ2q∗, the right-hand side of the ﬁrst-order condition
goes to inﬁnity, forcing q∗ to tend to zero. This happens because, as the en-
trepreneur cannot sell all the shares, he must always support some of the risk;
when his risk aversion increases, the only way to compensate is to decrease
the output towards zero.
18From expression (31), it can be shown that the equilibrium output is no longer Pareto
optimal.
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4 Final Remarks
In this paper, we have discussed the issue of existence of an equilibrium
when integrating the real and ﬁnancial markets. After showing that there
is in general no Nash equilibrium with a competitive ﬁnancial market, we
impose several restrictions on the set for the total number of shares issued.
Each restrictions yields existence of an equilibrium. Another way to ensure
existence is to do away with the hypothesis of competitive ﬁnancial market
by assuming instead that either the entrepreneur or the investor can inﬂuence
the ﬁnancial price.
It is important to continue studying the interaction of shareholders in
markets and their inﬂuence on the behavior of the ﬁrm. The interaction
between real and ﬁnancial markets deserves further researching, namely in-
troducing asymmetric information on some of the parameters, a multi-period
time horizon and the possibility of learning and experimenting.
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A Pareto Optimality
To see Pareto optimality, notice that (17) is the solution of
max
ω,q
CEE = max
ω,q
{
ω · PR(q)q + p∗F · (1− ω) · S − aEσ2ω2q2/2
}
(41)
where S = S, and subject to W ∗ = WI+(PR(q)q/S−p∗F )z−aIσ2(q/S)2z2/2,
for W ∗ > 0. Hence, the Lagrangian is
L = ω · PR(q)q + p∗F · (1− ω) · S − aEσ2ω2q2/2
+ λ
(
W ∗ −WI − (PR(q∗)q/S + p∗F )z + aIσ2(q/S)2z2/2
)
, (42)
so that
∂L
∂q
= ω·[P ′R(q∗)q∗ + PR(q∗)]−aEσ2ω2q+λ
[
(−P ′R(q∗)q∗ − PR(q∗))z/S + aIσ2(z/S)2q
]
= 0.
(43)
Setting W ∗ so that λ = −1, and using the market-clearing condition z =
(1− ω)S or z/S = 1− ω into (43) yields (17).
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